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A CAUSE FOR CONCERN: THE NEED FOR 
PROXIMATE CAUSE IN SEC ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS AND HOW THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
GOT IT WRONG IN SEC v. TEO 
Abstract: On February 10, 2014, in SEC v. Teo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit held that, in an action for disgorgement of profits under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) does not 
have the burden of proving proximate cause. The court reasoned that the SEC 
must only prove but-for causation between alleged wrongdoing and ill-gotten 
profits. This Comment argues that, going forward, the Third Circuit should reject 
Teo and apply a proximate cause standard, especially regarding proceeds. Should 
the Supreme Court reach the issue in the future, it should similarly reject the 
Third Circuit’s reasoning in Teo. Courts should require the SEC to show a proxi-
mate link between the alleged securities violation and the profits to be disgorged 
in order to avoid turning the remedy into an impermissible penalty. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is unlikely that investors enjoy filing paperwork with the Securities Ex-
change Commission (SEC), but, like it or not, the SEC requires numerous dis-
closures and reports.1 Burdensome though it may be, those who violate the 
SEC’s regulations face the prospect of civil and criminal penalties.2 Under fed-
eral securities law, investors owning more than five percent of a certain class 
of stock are required to disclose to the SEC the number of shares owned and 
the amount paid for those shares.3 
The U.S. Code does not provide a remedy for violations of this provision, 
but courts have widely accepted that the SEC has the equitable remedy of dis-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (2014) (requiring that any person who becomes the benefi-
cial owner of more than five percent of any equity security must file with the SEC the information 
required by Schedule 13D within ten days); id. § 240.13e-4(b)-(d) (listing filings and disclosures re-
quired by issuer of a tender offer); id. § 240.13f-1(a) (requiring filing by investment managers holding 
securities with an aggregate fair market value of at least $100 million). 
 2 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2012) (conferring authority on federal courts to grant monetary penal-
ties and equitable relief for securities violations);17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (providing that “[f]ailure to 
disclose the information requested by this schedule may result in civil or criminal action”). 
 3 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1). These mandatory disclosures are referred to as “Schedule 13D” 
disclosures, and violations of the disclosure rules as “section 13(d) violations.” See generally Lora C. 
Siegler, Annotation, Availability of Implied Private Action for Violation of § 13 of Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78m), 110 A.L.R. FED. 758 (1992) (explaining the provisions of 
the Securities Exchange Act, SEC regulations under the Act, and subsequent violations of the Act). 
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gorgement in order to deprive wrongdoers from their unjust gains.4 In order to 
calculate the amount a wrongdoer must disgorge, federal courts adjudicating 
SEC enforcement cases generally apply a burden-shifting framework.5 The 
federal circuits, however, are divided on how to apply the requirement of cau-
sation within that framework.6 
In 2014, in SEC v. Teo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
held that the SEC does not have the burden of proving a proximate link be-
tween illegal activity and the profits sought to be disgorged.7 In Teo, the court 
interpreted relevant case law as only requiring the SEC to prove but-for cause.8 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See, e.g., SEC v. Platforms Wireless Internet Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010) (stat-
ing that courts have broad equitable powers to order disgorgement in securities violations cases); SEC 
v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that federal courts can order 
disgorgement for insider trading violations and do in fact routinely order disgorgement); SEC v. 
Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1096 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that courts have the equitable power to order dis-
gorgement). In an opinion joined by then Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the D.C. Circuit held that dis-
gorgement was available as an equitable remedy because the Securities Exchange Act vested jurisdic-
tion in the federal courts. See First City, 890 F.2d at 1230. 
 5 See Platforms Wireless, 617 F.3d at 1096; SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2004); First 
City, 890 F.2d at 1232. Under the framework, the SEC must put forth a reasonable approximation of 
profits causally connected to the securities violation. See First City, 890 F.2d at 1231–32. The burden 
then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the figure is not a reasonable approximation. See id. at 
1232. The SEC bears the ultimate burden of persuasion that its disgorgement figure is a reasonable 
approximation of the defendant’s unjust gain. See id. The D.C. Circuit’s burden-shifting structure has 
been widely accepted across circuits. See, e.g., SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 31–32 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(applying the D.C. Circuit’s burden-shifting framework); Platforms Wireless, 617 F.3d at 1096 
(same); Happ, 392 F.3d at 31 (same). 
 6 See infra notes 39–55 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the federal circuit 
courts of appeals). Compare SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 675 
(2014) (concluding that the SEC’s initial burden is only to prove but-for cause and an intervening 
cause raised by the defendant is not dispositive), with Happ, 392 F.3d at 32 (reasoning that the SEC’s 
measure of disgorgement was reasonable because the SEC provided evidence of a proximate causal 
connection which the defendant failed to disprove), First City, 890 F.2d at 1232 (reasoning that dis-
gorgement is a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to wrongdoing which can be 
invalidated by evidence of causal attenuation), and SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 
1104 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that proceeds of illegal profit could not be disgorged because it consti-
tuted a penalty). 
 7 See 746 F.3d at 107 (holding that the investor was unjustly enriched as a result of his securities 
violations). Proximate cause can be thought of as a policy question asking how far liability for a par-
ticular action should extend. See Peter Tipps, Note, Controlling the Lead Paint Debate: Why Control 
Is Not an Element of Public Nuisance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 605, 628–29 (2009) (discussing the character-
istics of proximate cause within the context of public nuisance liability). Proximate cause looks at 
how far removed an individual’s conduct is from a resulting harm, and seeks to determine if the harm 
was a foreseeable consequence of that harm. See id. As applied to the remedy of disgorgement, prox-
imate cause looks at whether or not the defendant’s profit is directly attributable to the underlying 
wrong, taking into account causal attenuation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51 cmt. 
f (2011) (discussing causation and remoteness as applied to the elements of disgorgement). 
 8 See 746 F.3d at 107. But-for cause is a hypothetical construct that asks whether or not a given 
event would have occurred in the same manner even if a particular factor were removed. See Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (discussing the meaning of but-for cause). A par-
ticular factor is considered a but-for cause of an event if that event would not have occurred absent the 
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This holding diverges from the case law of other circuits, which have all re-
quired the SEC to show some level of proximate cause.9 Despite this emerging 
disagreement amongst the circuits, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari 
when the defendants in Teo appealed.10 
This Comment argues that, going forward, the Third Circuit should reject 
its reasoning in Teo and join its sister circuits by requiring the SEC to show 
proximate cause in securities enforcement actions, thereby ensuring the dis-
gorgement remedy does not become a penalty.11 Part I of this Comment dis-
cusses the factual and procedural history of the Teo case.12 Part II analyzes the 
reasoning employed by the Third Circuit, and then contrasts the Third Circuit’s 
rationale with that of the conflicting circuits.13 Finally, Part III suggests that 
the Third Circuit misinterpreted the application of causation in SEC enforce-
ment actions.14 Accordingly, the reasoning in Teo should be rejected and the 
element of proximate cause more adequately applied to the remedy of dis-
gorgement.15 
I. WHERE TEO FIRST WENT WRONG 
A. Factual History 
Teo involved an enforcement action brought by the SEC against an inves-
tor, defendant Alfred Teo.16 In 1992, the defendant established the MAAA 
                                                                                                                           
factor. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. b (2005) (discussing but-for cause in tort law). 
The but-for test seeks to determine if a particular factor was a necessary condition for an outcome, but 
not necessarily that it was the exclusive cause. See id. § 26 cmts. b, c. 
 9 See, e.g., Happ, 392 F.3d at 32 (applying principals of proximate cause in determining the rea-
sonableness of a proposed measure of disgorgement); First City, 890 F.2d at 1232 (explaining that a 
lack of proximate cause might invalidate a proposed measure of disgorgement); Manor Nursing, 458 
F.2d at 1104–05 (holding that policy justifications did not warrant disgorging proceeds made on ille-
gal income); see also SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 53–54 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc) (reasoning 
that insider trader’s liability was limited by causation to ill-gotten gains). Proximate cause will often 
become most important when a defendant has earned consequential gains or proceeds on the illegally 
obtained income. See Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION 
§§ 51(5)(a), 53 cmt. d (2011) (noting that “[e]ven conscious wrongdoers are not liable for all identifi-
able consequential gains, however, because of the requirement that such gains be not unduly remote”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 10 Teo v. SEC, 135 S. Ct. 675 (2014) (denying certiorari). 
 11 See infra notes 56–73 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 16–38 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 39–55 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 56–73 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 56–73 and accompanying text. 
 16 See 746 F.3d at 93. The SEC filed its complaint against the defendant in 2004, alleging claims 
of insider trading and false filings. Complaint at 1, SEC v. Teo, No. 2:04-cv-01815(SDW)(MCA) 
(D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2011), 2004 WL 1374570, at *1. 
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Trust, of which he was the beneficial owner.17 By 1997, the defendant and his 
trust held approximately 5.25 percent of the stock in Musicland, a Delaware 
corporation that sold music, books, and computer software.18 Significantly, 
Musicland had a shareholder rights plan, otherwise known as a “poison pill” 
provision, which could be activated if any individual or group owned at least 
17.5 percent of the company’s stock.19 
Up until 1998, the defendant properly disclosed his Musicland holdings 
as being below the “poison pill” threshold in accordance with the Securities 
Exchange Act.20 By December of 2000, however, the defendant and his trust 
owned a combined 35.97 percent of Musicland’s shares, and failed to report 
this to either the SEC or Musicland.21 As a result of the defendant’s failure to 
disclose the amount of his ownership, Musicland was unable to activate its 
“poison pill” provision.22 
In December of 2000, Best Buy announced a tender offer of all Musicland 
shares, which caused a subsequent increase in the Musicland stock price.23 In 
response, the defendant sold a portion of his shares both on the market and to 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Teo, 746 F.3d at 93 (describing the defendant’s holdings, which were the subject of the SEC 
enforcement action). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. “Poison pill” provisions have existed in corporate law since the 1980s. See Patrick J. 
Thompson, Note, Shareholder Rights Plans: Shields or Gavels?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 173, 173–75 
(1982) (explaining the rise and validity of shareholder rights plans). The provisions were created in 
response to an increase in the number of hostile takeovers, and are typically enacted by a corpora-
tion’s board of directors without shareholder approval. See id. at 173–76. If activated by a triggering 
event, such as a tender offer by an acquiring corporation, shareholders of the target corporation re-
ceive the right to purchase shares of stock at a specified price. See id. at 176. The purpose of the “poi-
son pill” provision is to protect the company in the event of a hostile takeover by an outsider. See Teo, 
746 F.3d at 93. Activating the provision would dilute the holdings of the hostile buyer, thereby mak-
ing it more difficult to acquire a controlling share. See id. 
 20 See Teo, 746 F.3d at 93; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012) (requiring reporting to the SEC by 
any person owning more than a five percent beneficial share of any class of stock). In 1997, the de-
fendant properly reported that he and his trust owned 5.25 percent of Musicland. Teo, 746 F.3d at 93. 
Beginning in July of 1998, the defendant’s SEC filings misrepresented his ownership in Musicland. 
Id. at 93–94. He disclosed to the SEC that he “ceased to have investment powers with respect to the 
trust,” but in reality continued to purchase Musicland stock on behalf of the trust. Id. 
 21 Teo, 746 F.3d at 94. 
 22 See id. (stating that the defendant’s intent was to prevent the implementation of the poison pill). 
By falsely reporting that he owned less than 17.5 percent of Musicland, the defendant prevented the 
company from being able to implement the poison pill in response to a takeover attempt. See id. at 
93–94. 
 23 See id. at 94. Though the term “tender offer” includes numerous different transactions, it can be 
thought of as simply a bid to purchase stock from shareholders above the market price. See generally 
ARNOLD S. JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT—TENDER OFFERS AND STOCK ACCUMULATIONS (2015) 
(describing the conventional definition of tender offer by analyzing legislative history and SEC regu-
lations). 
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Best Buy, resulting in gross proceeds of $154,932,011.24 Of this amount, the 
defendant profited $21,087,345 from the shares that he failed to report in his 
SEC filings.25 
B. Procedural History 
The SEC began investigating the defendant for securities fraud and, in 
April 2004, filed a civil enforcement action against him.26 Amongst other vio-
lations, the SEC accused the defendant of violating sections 13(d) and 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act.27 In 2011, in the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey, a jury found the defendant guilty of having violated vari-
ous rules and regulations of the Securities Exchange Act.28 Thereafter, an issue 
of primary focus became the SEC’s action to disgorge the defendant of the 
profits earned from his illegal activity.29 
Following the jury verdict against the defendant and his trust, the SEC 
filed a motion to disgorge the profits earned as a result of the illegal activity.30 
The district court found that the defendant’s profits were the result of his secu-
rities violations committed beginning in July, 1998, and held that the majority 
his profit could be disgorged.31 The court based its reasoning on case law indi-
                                                                                                                           
 24 Teo, 746 F.3d at 94. Musicland’s stock price increased shortly following the Best Buy tender 
offer. See id. After selling some shares on the open market, the defendant sold all of his remaining 
shares to Best Buy. See id. 
 25 Id. The defendant’s original cost to acquire the shares was $89,453,549. Id. He then sold them 
for $154,932,011. Id. The court’s calculation of a roughly $21 million profit is the result of taking into 
account the date of the defendant’s first SEC reporting violation. See id. 
 26 Id. (noting that the defendant was charged with violating sections 13(d) and 10(b) of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act); Complaint, supra note 16, at 4–5 (alleging insider trading violations and seeking 
disgorgement and injunctions). 
 27 Teo, 746 F.3d at 94. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires disclosure to the SEC by 
any person holding more than a five percent share of company’s stock. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) 
(2012). For example, section 13(d) is a reference to the regulation requiring disclosure on a specific 
form by an investor. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2014). Specifically, the regulation provides that 
“[a]ny person who, after acquiring . . . beneficial ownership of any equity security . . . , is directly or 
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than five percent of the class shall, within 10 days after the 
acquisition, file with the Commission, a statement containing the information required by Schedule 
13D . . . .” See id. 
 28 Teo, 746 F.3d at 94 (noting that the jury found the defendant guilty of violating sections 13(d), 
10(b), and other sections of the Securities Exchange Act). 
 29 See id. at 95. The SEC and defendant disagreed over the amount of profit that could be dis-
gorged, and whether or not the Best Buy tender offer was an intervening event limiting the defend-
ant’s liability. See SEC v. Teo, No. 2:04-cv-01815(SDW)(MCA), 2011 WL 4074085, at *6 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 12, 2011).  
 30 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Disgorgement, Prejudgment 
Interest, Civil Monetary Penalties and Injunctive Relief Against Defendants Alfred S. Teo, Sr. and the 
MAAA Trust at 35–36, Teo, No. 2:04-cv-01815(SDW)(MCA) (arguing for the maximum penalty 
possible against the defendant for his securities violations). 
 31 Teo, 2011 WL 407408, at *7 (concluding that the defendant’s actual profit which could be 
disgorged amounted to $21,087,345). 
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cating that district courts have broad discretion to set a disgorgement order, but 
that defendants have the ability to show that there is no causal connection be-
tween their profits and the illegal activity.32 The defendant asserted that his 
profits were not causally connected to his violations, but the court reasoned 
that, although there was uncertainty as to causation, any uncertainty should be 
resolved against the wrongdoer.33 
Thereafter, the defendant appealed the district court’s disgorgement ruling 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.34 The defendant argued that 
the SEC could only disgorge his profits upon a showing that his profits were 
proximately connected to his illegal activity, and that the profits were not at-
tributable to an intervening cause.35 The Third Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s order, but based its decision on the SEC’s burden of proof and the poli-
cy objectives of SEC enforcement cases.36 The dissenting opinion agreed that 
the SEC met its initial burden by showing but-for cause, but argued that the 
majority had failed to adequately take into account the intervening cause raised 
by the defendant.37 Following the Third Circuit’s decision, the defendant ap-
pealed but the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.38 
II. A CAUSAL DIVIDE: HOW THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S  
DECISION CREATED A SPLIT 
In calculating the proper measure of profits to be disgorged, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted the burden-shifting framework 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See id. at *5 (citing First City, 890 F.2d at 1230–32) (explaining that disgorgement is an equi-
table remedy which deprives a wrongdoer of unjust gain but which cannot be used punitively); SEC v. 
Antar, 97 F. Supp. 2d 576, 578 (D.N.J. 2000) (observing that district courts have broad discretion to 
fix a measure of disgorgement); SEC v. Bilzerian, 814 F. Supp. 116, 121 (D.D.C. 1993) (noting that a 
defendant may show disruption of the causal chain). 
 33 See Teo, 2011 WL 4074085, at *5–6 (citing First City, 890 F.2d at 1232) (determining that the 
defendant’s argument that his violations had no effect on the Musicland stock price were too specula-
tive and uncertain). 
 34 See Teo, 746 F.3d at 93. 
 35 See id. at 101. 
 36 See id. at 108–09. The distinction between but-for cause and proximate cause was central to the 
court’s decision. See id. at 107. The Third Circuit reasoned that the SEC only had to show but-for 
cause, a burden it presumptively met by showing the amount of profit the defendant earned on stock 
he had acquired while making false reports to the SEC. See id. The court determined that this was the 
extent of the SEC’s burden based on its reading of First City. See id. at 105–07 (stating that the First 
City burden-shifting framework only established a but-for cause requirement). By contrast, any issue 
of proximate cause had to be raised by the defendant, but an assertion of an intervening cause would 
not be dispositive. See id. at 107. The Third Circuit reasoned that the policies of deterrence and pre-
venting unjust enrichment had to weigh heavily in a court’s determination of whether profits are legal-
ly attributable to a defendant’s wrongdoing. See id. 
 37 See id. at 112 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority erred by treating disgorgement 
as an all-or-nothing proposition). 
 38 See Teo, 135 S. Ct. at 675 (denying certiorari). 
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derived from the 1989 D.C. Circuit case SEC v. First City Financial Corp.39 
The Third Circuit’s adoption of the framework is in-line with the jurisprudence 
of other federal circuit courts of appeals.40 Breaking from other courts’ deci-
sions, however, the Third Circuit held that, under this framework, the SEC on-
ly has the burden of establishing but-for causation between profits gained and 
alleged illegal activity.41 The Third Circuit based its rationale, in part, on the 
idea that tort principals of proximate cause are applicable in private enforce-
ment actions, but not in public enforcement actions brought by the SEC.42 The 
court reasoned that, unlike private suits, SEC enforcement actions had less 
need for an element of proximate because of the public policies those actions 
seek to enforce.43 
The Third Circuit also based its reasoning on an analysis of the Restate-
ment (Third) of Restitution.44 In particular, the Third Circuit focused on the 
comments to the Restatement that suggest courts should not give inordinate 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 105 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 675 (2014) (citing SEC v. 
First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). Under the burden-shifting framework, 
the SEC has the initial burden of providing a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected 
to the securities violation. See First City, 890 F.2d at 1231–32. The burden then shifts to the defendant 
to demonstrate that the figure is not a reasonable approximation. See id. at 1232. The SEC bears the 
ultimate burden of persuasion that its disgorgement figure is a reasonable approximation of the de-
fendant’s unjust gain. See id. 
 40 See, e.g., SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 31–32 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying the D.C. Circuit’s 
burden-shifting framework); SEC v. Platforms Wireless Internet Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1096 (9th Cir. 
2010) (same); SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2004) (same); see also supra note 5 and accom-
panying text (discussing the burden-shifting framework established by the D.C. Circuit). 
 41 See Teo, 746 F.3d at 107. The Third Circuit stated that application of the burden-shifting 
framework required the SEC to produce evidence of a “reasonable approximation” of profits illegally 
gained. Id. at 105. The court reasoned that the reasonable approximation of profits was essentially, if 
not overtly, a but-for burden of causation. See id. Satisfying this burden creates a presumption that 
profits were illegally gained, after which the defendant has the burden of showing that the SEC’s 
measure was not a “reasonable approximation.” See id. 
 42 See id. at 102. Because private suits seeking to redress individual harms have origins in com-
mon law torts, the plaintiff is required to prove that their monetary losses were proximately caused by 
the defendant’s illegal activity. See generally Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 
(2005) (holding that plaintiff’s complaint was legally insufficient because plaintiff failed to plead that 
losses were proximately caused by the defendant’s misrepresentation). 
 43 See Teo, 746 F.3d at 102. In defense of its proposition, the Third Circuit cited SEC v. Apuzzo. 
Id. at 103 (citing SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2012)). In Apuzzo, the Second Cir-
cuit held that, in actions brought under 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e), the SEC does not have the burden of prov-
ing that an aider and abettor proximately caused a securities law violation. See 689 F.3d at 213. 
 44 See Teo, 746 F.3d at 106. The Third Circuit reasoned that the First City burden-shifting frame-
work was based on the Restatement (Third) of Restitution. See id. The Restatement states that a claim-
ant may eliminate profit from wrongdoing through disgorgement, but that the remedy is not to be used 
as “the imposition of a penalty.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51(4)–(5) (2011). 
More aptly, the Restatement states that courts may use tests of causation, and that a claimant seeking 
disgorgement has the burden of producing a reasonable approximation of the wrongful gain. See id. 
§ 51(5). 
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weight to causation.45 The court’s reading of the Restatement led it to the con-
clusion that even if a defendant raises the issue of intervening causation, the 
issue is not dispositive.46 Instead, the policies of deterrence and preventing 
unjust enrichment must be heavily weighed.47 
In contrast, other circuits implicitly apply a proximate cause requirement, 
placing a greater burden on the SEC to show proximate causation.48 For exam-
ple, in 1972, in SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit held that the district court had erred in the measure of 
profits to be disgorged because there was an insufficient causal connection be-
tween the defendants’ wrongdoing and the ill-gotten gains.49 The Second Cir-
cuit reasoned that a portion of the district court’s measure included income 
earned on proceeds—income not proximately caused by the illegal activity—
and disgorging that income would have constituted a penalty.50 Furthermore, in 
1983, in SEC v. MacDonald, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 
sitting en banc, applied a more rigorous causal standard than mere but-for 
cause to the remedy of disgorgement.51 There, the court used proximate cause 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See Teo, 746 F.3d at 106 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51, cmt. f (2011) 
(“[I]t should be possible in almost every case to identify additional causes of the profit for which the 
defendant is liable.”)). 
 46 See id. at 107. 
 47 See id. 
 48 See, e.g., Happ, 392 F.3d at 31 (applying principal that profits must be causally connected to 
wrongdoing); First City, 890 F.2d at 1231 (same); SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 
1104–05 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that policy justifications did not warrant disgorging proceeds made 
on illegal income); see also SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 53–54 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc) (reason-
ing that insider trader’s liability was limited by causation to ill-gotten gains). 
 49 See 458 F.2d at 1105 (reversing district court order for a measure of disgorgement which in-
cluded both profits and proceeds of profits). The defendants in Manor Nursing were found to have 
violated various securities laws in connection with the sale of stock. See SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., 
Inc., 340 F. Supp. 913, 917–20 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d, 458 F.2d 1082. As a result, the district court 
ordered that the defendants disgorge any profit earned in connection with the sale. See id. at 936. The 
district court, however, also held that the defendants had to disgorge any proceeds earned from the 
investment of their profits. See id. 
 50 See Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104–05. The Second Circuit was concerned that the policy of 
deterrence did not justify turning disgorgement into a penalty assessment. See id. at 1104. While it 
was necessary to disgorge illicit profits, the court’s equitable powers were limited to profits connected 
to the wrongdoing. See id. Moreover, policy justifications, such as deterrence, were not enough to 
warrant disgorgement of the profits. See id. at 1104–05. More recently, in 2014, in SEC v. Wyly, the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York specifically declined to follow the causation 
analysis in Teo. See SEC v. Wyly, No. 10-cv-5760(SAS), 2014 WL 3739415, at *4 n.38 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 29, 2014) (“To the extent the Third Circuit has relieved the SEC of its initial burden to establish a 
causal connection between the profits and the violations when seeking disgorgement, this court disa-
grees and declines to follow Teo.”). 
 51 See 699 F.2d at 54–55 (“To call the additional profits made by the insider who held until the 
price went higher ‘ill-gotten gains,’ or ‘unjust enrichment,’ is merely to give a dog a bad name and 
hang him.”). In MacDonald, the defendant had inside knowledge about a lucrative transaction about to 
be completed by a real estate company. See id. at 48–49. In advance of the deal closing, in 1975, he 
purchased 9,500 shares at $4.625/share. Id. After the deal was announced the stock price surged to 
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principles and temporally limited the defendant’s liability to the period in 
which the full gain from the fraud was realized.52 More recently, in 2004, in 
SEC v. Happ, the First Circuit emphasized the importance of proximate cause 
in estimating a reasonable measure of profits connected to wrongdoing.53 The 
court reasoned that considerable attenuation of the causal connection—i.e. a 
lack of proximate cause—might invalidate the measure of disgorgement.54 
Similarly, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have also applied notions of proximate 
cause to actions for disgorgement in SEC enforcement cases.55 
III. THE CASE FOR PROXIMATE CAUSE AND HOW  
THE THIRD CIRCUIT GOT IT WRONG 
In future SEC enforcement actions, the Third Circuit should reject its rea-
soning in SEC v. Teo and join the First, Second, Ninth, Tenth and D.C. Circuits 
in requiring a proximate connection between illegal activity and illicit profits.56 
                                                                                                                           
$5.50/share, and closed the year at $5.75/share. See id. The defendant eventually sold his shares in 
1977 for $10/share. Id. The district court ordered the defendant to disgorge the entire profit realized 
from the sale, measured at $10/share. See id. at 52. On appeal, the First Circuit reversed. Id. at 55. 
 52 See id. at 54. The First Circuit instructed that the defendant’s profit be calculated using the 
price of the stock a reasonable time after the insider information was announced to the public. See id. 
at 55. The court’s reasoning implies that disgorgement must be limited by proximate cause, even if a 
greater assessment would better serve the policy of deterrence. See id. at 54. Here, disregarding the 
amount of time between the dissemination of the information and when the defendant sold his shares 
impermissibly ignored an insufficient causal connection between the wrongdoing and the profits to be 
disgorged. See id. 
 53 See 392 F.3d at 31–32. The defendant in Happ held shares in a company that was going 
through financial difficulty. See id. at 18. The company’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) contacted the 
defendant seeking advice, and mentioned that the company was having serious issues. See id. Shortly 
after being contacted by the CFO, the defendant sold all of his shares for $47,000. See id. Several 
weeks later the company’s board issued a press release announcing the problems, which caused a 
sharp drop in the stock price. See id. Following a conviction for insider trading, the defendant was 
ordered to disgorge $34,758 in loss avoided. See id. at 19. 
 54 See id. at 32. The court reasoned that there was a sufficient causal connection because the de-
fendant’s act of selling with knowledge of the financial problems directly enabled him to avoid the 
subsequent decline in stock price. See id. There was no evidence that anything other than the an-
nouncement of the financial problems caused the decline in stock price, which was exactly the infor-
mation the defendant acted on. See id. 
 55 See Platforms Wireless, 617 F.3d at 1096 (holding that SEC met its burden of reasonably ap-
proximating profits causally connected to wrongdoing and that there was no evidence that the SEC’s 
approximation included anything which was not unjust profit); SEC v. Maxxon, Inc., 465 F.3d 1174, 
1179 (10th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that a temporal limitation was necessary because disgorgement is not 
a punitive remedy). The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Maxxon implies that a “reasonable approxima-
tion” takes into account temporal limitations associated with proximate cause principles. See 465 F.3d 
at 1179. 
 56 See 746 F.3d 90, 107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 675 (2014) (holding that proximate 
cause is not an element of the SEC’s burden and, if raised, is not dispositive); SEC v. Platforms Wire-
less Internet Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010) (adopting the causation analysis of the First, 
Second, and D.C. Circuits); SEC v. Maxxon Inc., 465 F.3d 1174, 1179 (10th Cir. 2006) (reasoning 
that limitations are necessary to avoid disgorging profits which are not proximately caused by a viola-
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Disgorgement seeks to deprive a wrongdoer of their unjust gain.57 Accordingly, 
the SEC must bear the burden to causally differentiate legally and illegally ob-
tained profits.58 A reasonable attempt must be made or else both just and unjust 
gains could be forfeited.59 
First, the Third Circuit erred by glossing over the well-established princi-
pal that the SEC must set forth a reasonable approximation of profits causally 
connected to wrongdoing.60 The court took this requirement to mean that the 
SEC must only show but-for cause, and that a lack of proximate cause is not 
dispositive.61 This reasoning is problematic because it overlooks the possibility 
that an absence of proximate cause might make a proposed measure of profits 
inherently unreasonable.62 It also increases the risk that disgorgement might 
become a penalty by including both illegal profits and subsequent proceeds.63 
                                                                                                                           
tion); SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 116 n.25 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that the amount of disgorge-
ment cannot be more than the amount of money acquired by wrongdoing, because disgorgement is not 
a punitive remedy); SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that the amount of dis-
gorgement is a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to wrongdoing); SEC v. First 
City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231–32 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that proceeds of illegally earned 
income may not be subject to disgorgement if there is a break in the causal chain); SEC v. Manor 
Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104–05 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that disgorgement of proceeds of 
illegal profit was not permissible and constituted a penalty assessment where portion of profits was 
not proximately caused by violation). 
 57 See Cavanagh, 445 F.3d at 117; First City, 890 F.2d at 1230–31. The very act of depriving 
wrongdoers of their unjust gain deters future investors. See Cavanagh, 445 F.3d at 117. 
 58 See First City, 890 F.2d at 1231. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in First City (a case upon which 
many other circuits rely) implied that courts must weigh proximate cause when determining whether 
the SEC has satisfied its burden. See id.; supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the wide-
spread acceptance of the D.C. Circuit’s analysis). Failure to causally differentiate legal and illegal 
profits risks converting disgorgement into the impermissible imposition of a penalty. See First City, 
890 F.2d at 1231 (reasoning that the SEC must make a causal differentiation because disgorgement 
may not be used punitively); Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104 (overturning disgorgement of proceeds 
because it constituted a penalty); see also SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 306–07 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(distinguishing the equitable remedy of disgorgement from punitive criminal forfeiture). 
 59 See Maxxon, 465 F.3d at 1179; First City, 890 F.2d at 1231. Though the causal analysis might 
result in ambiguity as to the exact measure of unjust gain, it is permissible to resolve that ambiguity 
against the wrongdoer. See Happ, 392 F.3d at 31; First City, 890 F.3d at 1232. However, the court is 
ultimately bound by the maximum amount of illicit gain, not simply its own discretion. See Contorin-
is, 743 F.3d at 306 (reasoning that disgorgement is constrained by the maximum amount of gain caus-
ally connected to wrongdoing, because the remedy seeks to deprive unjust gain but may not be used as 
a penalty). 
 60 Compare Teo, 746 F.3d at 107 (stating that a reasonable approximation does not require a 
showing of proximate cause, in part because policy concerns weigh more heavily), with Manor Nurs-
ing, 458 F.2d at 1104 (reasoning that policy concerns do not justify ignoring a lack of proximate 
cause), and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51(5)(a) (2011) (requiring that profits to be 
disgorged not include unduly remote profits). 
 61 See Teo, 746 F.3d at 107 (interpreting various authorities as indicating that a but-for cause 
standard satisfies the reasonable approximation requirement). 
 62 See Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104 (reasoning that income earned on proceeds could not be 
disgorged because the income had no reasonable or justifiable connection to defendant’s unjust gain); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51(5)(a) (2011) (stating that “[p]rofit includes any form of 
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Second, a close reading of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution suggests 
that the Third Circuit misinterpreted the Restatement’s causation requirement.64 
The Third Circuit held that the “reasonable” requirement does not include 
proximate cause, in part based on its interpretation of the Restatement.65 The 
Restatement makes clear that courts may apply tests of causation and remote-
ness as necessary to avoid converting disgorgement into a penalty.66 The lan-
guage suggests that proximate cause is a necessary tool to distinguish just and 
unjust gain.67 The comments to the Restatement caution courts against relying 
too heavily on causation as a limiting factor for disgorgement, but this is only 
in recognition of the principal that not all causes are necessarily intervening.68 
                                                                                                                           
use value, proceeds, or consequential gains . . . that is not . . . unduly remote”). The comments to the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution illustrate the problem of disregarding proximate cause. See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 53 cmt. d, illust. 8 (2011). Suppose an investor commits fraud 
that results in $1 million in profit. See id. The investor then uses the entirety of that money to purchase 
Blackacre. See id. Over the course of ten years the investor uses unrelated income to make improve-
ments to Blackacre, such as building a home on the property, until ten years later the property is sold 
for $2 million. See id. Now suppose that of the $2 million, $1.5 million was for the value of the land 
and $500,000 for the value of the home. See id. It may be that the full $2 million cannot be disgorged 
because it stretches the outermost limits of but-for cause and includes profits that are unduly remote 
from the original wrongdoing. See id. § 53 cmt. d. Because only $1 million was proximately caused 
by the fraud, only that amount could be disgorged; any greater amount would be punitive. See id. 
(providing a similar example). 
 63 See Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104 (reasoning that portion of defendants’ proceeds were not 
causally connected to the wrongdoing and, if disgorged, would constitute an impermissible penalty). 
Even though the remedy is intended to prevent unjust gain, and even though the remedy is intended to 
deter future investors from violating securities laws, disgorgement becomes a penalty if the causal 
connection is too remote. See First City, 890 F.3d at 1231. 
 64 Compare Teo, 746 F.3d at 106 (interpreting the Restatement to mean that proximate cause 
should be considered in light of policy and other considerations), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION § 51 (2011) (requiring that profit cannot be disgorged if it is unduly remote from 
wrongdoing or if it becomes a penalty assessment). 
 65 See Teo, 746 F.3d at 106. The Third Circuit takes care to point out that the Restatement coun-
sels applying tests of causation “as reason and fairness dictate,” implying that policy considerations 
should be used to constrain the use of proximate cause. See id. at 106–07. However, the Restatement 
goes on to say that test of causation must be used in a manner consistent with the stated purpose of 
restitution. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51(5) (2011). The stated purpose of restitu-
tion is to eliminate unjust gain, so far as possible, without imposing a penalty. See id. § 51(4). 
 66 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51(4)–(5) (2011). Moreover, “profit” as defined 
in the Restatement includes sources of gain that are measurable and not unduly remote. See id. 
§ 51(5)(a). 
 67 See id. § 51(4)–(5). Theoretically, if a wrongdoer’s profit can include amounts which are undu-
ly remote from the underlying wrong, and those amounts may not be disgorged, then the SEC has 
likely failed its burden under the Restatement of producing a reasonable approximation by including 
unduly remote profits in its calculation. See id. §§ 51(5), 53 cmt. d. 
 68 Compare First City, 890 F.2d at 1232 (reasoning that intervening causes proposed by defend-
ant did not sever the causal chain because they were too speculative), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION § 51 cmt. f (2011) (stating that in nearly every case it would be possible to identify 
additional causes for the defendant’s unjust gain). 
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The SEC should be required to show proximate cause as a way of distin-
guishing just from unjust gains.69 Even though proximate cause should be an 
element of the SEC’s initial burden, it need not be an onerous burden.70 The 
SEC must simply make a reasonable approximation.71 So long as a court is 
weighing causal considerations, such as remoteness or attenuation, it would be 
doing enough to ensure that disgorgement is not being used punitively.72 The 
Third Circuit simply failed to adequately weigh proximate cause and unneces-
sarily lowered the SEC’s evidentiary burden.73 
CONCLUSION 
In enforcement actions by the SEC arising under the Securities Exchange 
Act, the SEC should bear the burden of showing proximate cause between ille-
gal activity and unjust gain. To hold otherwise creates the undue risk that de-
                                                                                                                           
 69 See First City, 890 F.2d at 1231; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51(5) (2011). The 
SEC must make a causal distinction to avoid turning the remedy into a penalty. See First City, 890 
F.2d at 1231. 
 70 See Happ, 392 F.3d at 31–32 (reasoning that the SEC presumptively satisfied its burden by 
showing a change in stock price resulting from the public disclosure of insider information upon 
which the defendant had acted); First City, 890 F.2d at 1232 (reasoning that the SEC satisfied its bur-
den by providing evidence of actual profits of the tainted transactions). 
 71 See Happ, 392 F.3d at 31; First City, 890 F.2d at 1232. Suppose the SEC provided evidence, 
even if weak evidence, that a particular measure of profit was caused by the defendant’s wrongdoing. 
Cf. First City, 890 F.2d at 1230–32 (suggesting that the SEC met its burden by placing a reasonable 
temporal limitation on its calculation on unjust gain); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51 
cmt. f. (2011) (suggesting that a reasonable approximation of profits does not necessitate proving the 
definite and exclusive cause of the profit). For instance, the SEC could satisfy its evidentiary burden 
by establishing a timeframe during which illegal activity occurred. Cf. Maxxon, 465 F.3d at 1179 
(reasoning that the evidentiary burden could be satisfied where “the end date chose results in a ‘rea-
sonable approximation’ of profits”). If thereafter the defendant failed to produce additional evidence 
severing the causal chain, the court would be acting within its discretion to follow the SEC’s estima-
tion. See Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 32; First City, 890 F.2d at 1232. 
 72 See First City, 890 F.2d at 1232 (considering the reasonableness of other possible causes com-
pared to the SEC’s approximation of profits); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51(4)–(5) 
(2011). Arguably, the reasoning applied by the district court in Teo actually achieves this result. See 
No. 2:04-cv-01815(SDW)(MCA), 2011 WL 4074085, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2011). The district court 
limited its measure of illegal profits to the period during which the illegal activity occurred. See id. 
Moreover, the court analyzed whether or not there were any intervening causes, but ultimately con-
cluded that the suggested intervening causes were too speculative to destroy the causal connection. 
See id. at *6–7. 
 73 Compare Teo, 746 F.3d at 107–08 (reasoning that a court must give greater weight to policy 
goals of disgorgement than the element of causation), with Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 
16–17, Teo v. SEC, 135 S. Ct. 675 (2014) (No. 14-00019), 2014 WL 5077238, at *16–17 (providing 
evidence that defendant’s profits were the direct the result of the illegal activity). Arguably most tell-
ing, the SEC did not rely on the Third Circuit’s reasoning in its argument in opposition to defendant’s 
petition for a writ of certiorari. See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, supra, at 16–17. The SEC 
argued, rather, that there was proximate cause between the defendant’s illegal activity and the profits 
earned. See id. Specifically, the SEC contended that the purpose of the defendant’s illegal scheme was 
the direct result that occurred— namely, obtaining illegal profits by selling stock at a profit. See id. 
150 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
fendants will be overly punished for their actions by being forced to disgorge 
proceeds that are unduly remote. However, the SEC need not prove that the 
proposed cause is the exclusive cause, just that it is reasonable. The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s ruling in SEC v. Teo goes needlessly far in 
lowering the SEC’s burden. Instead, courts should require a showing of proxi-
mate cause, while still retaining their equitable discretion to prevent unjust 
gain. 
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